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STARE DECISIS -

NO. 4.

WHERE AWAY

Nowadays we wonder whether our ideas on what
this term means are not becoming slightly mixed. To
abide by the decided cases takes in a lot of territory.
Facts alter cases but not the law. Perhaps to limit
the term to the law in the particular case would
make it a small doctrine but in establishing reliability
and stability by decision we should not lose sight of
equity. The courage of courts is in the exception and
not the rule. No rule should be so hard and fast that
with impunity it disregards inevitable change. But a
variant from it must and should avoid retrospective
application which visit unjust consequences on vested
rights.
While we are a code state let's not go too far afield
from the "characteristic" principle of the common law
that gave this very principle birth. It drew its life
from the equity in the case, from the exercise and
right of justice to adjust the hard rule of law to fit
the circumstances of the case.
And there is no reason why its practice should not
be as flexible and adoptable to change as it was in its
inception. It was then a legal servant- not our lord
and master.
Though we want stable and reliable rules in our decisions. Our present situation in the legal field is at
least partially due to a disregard of the principle of
(Continued on Next Page)
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progress in the ever expanding administration of justice under
new and changing conditions.
Of course our courts should distinguish the change-but
brevity is still the soul of wit-and it can well be repeated that
"adequate" brevity in this constantly increasing stream of the
legal opinions of our courts would be much appreciated by the
profession.
And while we are not advocates of statutory control of the
decisions or the fixing of rules by that method to obtain stability,
our labor is still an endless organic process to insure law to the undying body of society, it is still to the accurate, keen, just and
fearless spirits of our profession to function and perform in the
life of the law as it has been in the past. It is still not words but
things that make the body of our law and if you haven't given
much thought to old Stare Decisis you better begin to do so,
before he gets out of control.
SEC.
EMERGENCY LAWS
For the past several years, your association has arranged
with the Bismarck Tribune for the publication of the Emergency
Laws and they have been sent to each member as a part of a
regular issue of the Tribune. They are sent in this way to save
expense. Each year we have paid part of the cost and have
assisted in selecting the laws to be published. You can readily
understand that it would be a useless expenditure to publish all
of the Emergency Laws. For instance the renewal of the sales
tax law; some repeals; some appropriations, etc We intend to
include everything of general interest, as well as those that are
vital and important.
However, it takes time to obtain copies of all such laws. The
force in the Secretary of State's office have their regular work
and are getting out mimeograph copies of these laws as rapidly
as possible. Those to be printed have been selected and are being
set up for publication as fast as received from the Secretary of
State's office. Headings on all of those not printed in full will be
given, so that, if necessary, copies can be secured from the Secretary of State. We hope to have the publication in your hands
within the next week or ten days.
SEC.
BANKRUPTCY - FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
A farmer-debtor seeks to have the land appraised and be
all6wed to redeem it at that appraised amount. The secured
creditor, however, claimed that according to Section 75 subsection (s) (3), its request for a sale took precedence over any such
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right of the debtor. The lower courts affirmed the contentions of
the secured creditor. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court it was
held: the debtor was entitled to have the property reappraised or
the value fixed at a hearing; that the value having been determined at a hearing in conformity with his request, he was then
entitled to have a reasonable time, fixed by the court, in which to
redeem at that value; and that if he did so redeem, the land
should be turned over to him free and clear of encumbrances and
his discharge granted. Only in case the debtor failed to redeem
within a reasonable time would the court be authorized to order a
public sale. Modified and remanded. Wright v. Union Central
Life Insurance Company et al, 61 Sup. Ct. 196 (1940).
To see the effect of this case it might be well to consider the
background as set out by prior decisions. Under the provisions of
subsection (s) (3) the farmer is given the right to pay the
amount of the appraisal into court and to secure title to and full
possession of the property at the end of three years or at any time
prior thereto. However, this is followed by a proviso that upon
request in writing by-any secured creditor or creditors, the court
shall order the property upon which such secured creditors have
a lien to be sold at public auction. This provision had been construed by the Supreme Court to give the secured creditor a right
to bid at the public sale. In the words of the court - "but it must
be assumed that the mortgagor will not get the property for less
than its actual value. The act provides that upon the creditor's
request the property must be appraised or sold at public auction;
and the mortgagee may by bidding at such sale fully protect his
interests." Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440, 57 Sup. Ct.
556 (Va. 1937). As to the question whether the debtor had a
right to purchase at the appraised value, quoting the words of
the court in In re Anderson, 22 F. Supp. 928 (D. C. N. D. 1938)
"this debtor apparently assumed that he could force the mortgagee to accept the appraised value. The Supreme Court in
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Redford, 295 U. S. 555, at
page 580, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 859, 79 L. Ed. 1593, 97 A. L. R. 1106,
said: 'this right of the mortgagee to insist upon full payment before giving up his security has been deemed of the essence of a
mortgage.'" As a result of these decisions ". . . if the provisions
regarding a public sale are strictly interpreted to permit creditors
to demand public auctions arbitrarily and automatically and to
bid the full amounts of their claims at such sales arbitrarily, it is
evident that a farmer's hope of retaining his farm at its fair value
is dependent entirely on the whim of his secured creditor." Alfred
Letzler, Bankruptcy Reorganizations for Farmers, (1940) 40 Col.
Law Rev. 1133, 1153. In In re Shenorhokian, 22 F. Supp. 695
(S. D. Cal. 1938) at page 696, the court said: "the right of a secured creditor to the amount of his debt or ultimately to bid that
amount at a sale of the property . . . cannot be taken away from
the creditor."
In the light of these decisions it would seem that the purpose
and object of the FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT had been violated. In
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a congressional committee report it was stated: "the object of
section 75 is to save and protect the farmer's home and farm.
Obviously that cannot be done if the mortgagee says 'I do not
care what the value is. I will bid the full amount of the mortgage.' Vengeance and hatred should not be permitted by Congress or by courts when it has for its object the destruction of a
home." Sen. Rep. No. 1045, 76th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1939). In a
comprehensive and well-written article on this point (Bankruptcy
Reorganizations for Farmers, supra), the author stated in footnote 73, p. 1155, "doubts have been expressed as to the constitutionality of a complete denial to creditors of the right to have a
public sale and to bid thereat .... But a limited prohibition effected through a farmer's right to take the property at a fair appraised value would not seem an unreasonable requirement or an
unconstitutional deprivation of any genuine property right." By
the court's latest decision in the principal case this suggestion has
been fulfilled.
What is the present position of the farmer-debtor? He now
has an increased and effective bargaining power to aid in bringing about a composition agreement under section 75 subsections
(a) to (r). Up to this time this section has been practically useless because the creditor could always have his public sale and
bid the full amount thereof. There was no incentive for him to
accept a less amount in full settlement. Now, however, if the
creditor refuses the composition agreement presented by the
farmer, he suffers the chance that upon appraisal the value may
be set at a lower figure than that offered by the farmer. He, of
course, now has the absolute prior right to purchase at that appraised value before a public sale can be demanded by the creditor.
It would appear, then, that the Supreme Court by the decision in
our instant case has put teeth in the FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT by
permitting the farmer to secure part of that relief which it was
the ultimate purpose of the Act to give. However, there is still
an opening for the creditors under subsection (s) (3) which
reads, "if, however, the debtor at any time fails to comply with
the provisions of this section, or with any orders of the court
made pursuant to this section, or is unable to refinance himself
within three years, the court may order the appointment of a
trustee, and order the property sold or otherwise disposed of as
provided for in this act."
Although the phrase "unable to refinance" appears to give the creditor a lenient method to terminate the three-year stay, the court has interpreted this section
to the effect that a farmer under this section is entitled to a
three-year stay, which can be terminated prior to the end of the
three years only if he fails to comply with the provisions of the
law or with the orders of the court. Borchard v. California Bank,
107 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). "Under this interpretation,
the court would not be authorized to terminate the stay and order
the property-sold prior to the end of the three-year period merely
upon a showing that the debtor could not be rehabilitated."
Bankruptcy Reorganizations for Farmers, supra, page 1149.
However, the court was not too explanatory on this point and con-
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sequently if the provisions of subsections (s) (3) are construed
strictly, there is the questtion of what is meant by "inability to
refinance" and also when may the creditor use this as a basis for
a sale. In the case of Wright v. Vinton Branch, supra, the court
appeared to take the stand that there must be evidence only after
a "reasonable time" that the debtor is unable to refinance himself, and the case of Bartels v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 100 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), aff'd, 308
U. S. 180, 60 Sup. Ct. 221 (1939), woild seem to interpret the
"reasonable time" liberally. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
held in the instance case that even though the creditor does secure a termination of the three-year stay, the debtor still has the
right to purchase at the appraised or reappraised value prior to
a public sale.
ROY A. NESTE,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
COURTS-AUTHORITY OF STATE DECISIONS
IN FEDERAL COURTS
In an action to compel a corporation to restore remaindermen's rights in shares of stock which the corporation had wrongfully transferred to a life tenant without any disclosure of the
limitation appearing upon the certificate, an intermediate appellate court of Ohio denied relief upon the ground that under
Ohio law it was a prerequisite to recovery that remaindermen
allege and prove demand upon the corporation to restore the remaindermen's rights, and that corporation had refused said demand. Demand was then made by the remaindermen and suit
was instituted in a federal court, there being diversity of citizenship. Held, that federal courts are bound to apply a decision of
an intermediate appellate state court as the "state law," when
there has been no determination of the point in question by the
state supreme court, and in the absence of persuasive data that
the highest court of the state would decide differently. West et
al. vs. American Telephone and Telegraph Compan'y, 311 U. S. -,
6-1 S. Ct. 179, 85 L. ed. 146 (Ohio, 1940).
This is the farthest the Supreme Court has ever extended the
doctrine of "state law" as defined in Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 725, 8 F. C. A. Tit. 28 Sec. 725; 28
U. S. C. Sec. 726; said provision reading: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
The construction of this section as announced in Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842), was followed for almost a
century, and with increasing dissatisfaction by many judges and
attorneys. In brief, the Swift case held that "state law" under
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Section 34 applies only to positive state statutes and their interpretation by local tribunals and to local usages of a fixed and
permanent nature, but not to questions of a more general character. But finally by its decision in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R.
1487 (1938), the Supreme Court ended the checkered career of
Swift v. Tyson, supra, with its doctrine of general federal law,
ruling that the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state, whether declared by the state legislature in a statute or by
the highest state court in a decision, and whether it be a matter
of "general" law, or "local" law, there being no federal common
law. Of course constitutionally recognized federal fields, such as
bankruptcy, remain unaffected.
The main point to be noted in the recent case of West et al.
v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, supra, is that it
went a step further than Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,
supra, and held that federal courts are bound to follow decisions
of a county court of appeals, in the absence of applicable decisions
by the State Supreme Court. There is only one previous federal
decision in accord with the doctrine announced in the West case.
In re Shyvers, 33 F. Supp. 643 (1940), holds that a decision of a
California District Court of Appeals, rehearing of which was denied by the California Supreme Court, is to be regarded as binding upon federal courts in California. On the other hand there
have been numerous recent federal decisions to the contrary,
holding that federal courts are not bound to follow decisions of
intermediate appellate state courts. The Court states in the West
case that decision of an intermediate appellate state court is not
to be disregarded by a federal court, unless it is convinced by
other persuasive data that the highest court of the State would
hold otherwise. The question arises, what is meant by other
persuasive data? It could not be a decision of the state supreme
court on the same point as such decision would be controlling in
the case under determination. It therefore seems that "persuasive data," as used, refers either to cases decided by the state
supreme court which, although not in point, are similar to the
immediate case; or that there has been some indication by dictum
from the state supreme court that the point would be decided in
a certain way. Conversely, the Court appears to indicate that
inasmuch as that in the West case the Ohio Supreme Court had
refused to review the decision of the intermediate appellate state
court, this might be "persuasive data" that the State Supreme
Court would be in accord with the inferior state court, thus making a stronger case in favor of following the decision of intermediate state court by the federal court.
What is to be done in the case where there are no state decisions for the federal courts to follow? The general rule seems
to be that the point will be determined in light of general jurisprudence on the subject, and of state decisions on analogous
question. Life. Assur. Assoc. of U. S. vs. First National Bank
of Birmingham, 113 F. (2d) 272 (1940). Thus federal courts
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may yet, just as state courts, have to ascertain common law points
of fit-st impression in the jurisdiction.
In conclusion, what is to be the "state law" where there are
two or more appellate state courts in conflict in their decisions,
and no State Supreme Court holding? When the supreme court

decisions of the state are in conflict, the later decision is controlling on the federal court as expressing the present state law.
Dayton and Michigan R. Co. v. Commission of Internal Revenue,
112 F. (2d) 627 (1940).
It is submitted that the same method
could be used in respect to intermediate appellate state courts, or
possibly the law as determined by the state appellate court division in which the federal court in question is sitting could be used
as the proper reference. In time, no doubt, the questions arising
from the decision in the Erie Railroad Company case will be
answered, as they come up before the United States Supreme
Court, and the principal case is one helpful as a partial clarifica-

tion of what is meant by "state law."
HALVOR L. HALVORSON, JR.
Third Year Law Student
University of North Dakota.

OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Christine Messersmith, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Leo R. Reilly et al., Defts.
and Respts.
That a promissory note containing a provision to pay interest at a rate
which is lawful at the time the note is executed is not rendered usurious by
the execution of a subsequent supplementary contract agreeing to pay interest in excess of the lawful rate as consideration for the extension of the
time of payment of the original note.
That in the absence of legislative intent showing the contrary, a statute
is deemed to act prospectively only; and legislation reducing the rate of lawful interest which may be charged, enacted subsequent to the execution of a
note providing for interest at a rate then valid, does not taint the promissory
note with usury.
That where after the execution of a promissory note, providing for
the payment of interest at a valid rate, a contract is made to pay interest
at a usurious rate, the payments of interest under such second contract must
be credited upon the principal; but the irate specified in the promissory note
stands. Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Stark County;
Hon. Harvey J. Miller, Judge.
AFFIRaMED.
Opinion of the Court by
Burr, Ch. J.

In State of North Dakota ex rel Reo L. Knauss, Petr., vs. Joseph Kohler.
as Sheriff of Burleigh County, Respt.
That where a defendant has been convicted in a police magistrate's court
of violating a city ordinance and sentenced to both fine and imprisonment,
he may appeal to the district court from a judgment of conviction within ten
days from the pronouncement of such judgment.
That where, in appealing from a police magistrate's court to a district
court, the appellant files a notice of appeal which has not been served on
the city attorney, and also files an undertaking on appeal limited in amount
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which is approved by the magistrate and then certifies the record to the
district court and release the appellant from custody, the magistrate may
not ignore the appeal thus pending and remand the appellant to custody.
Original application for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Reo L. Knauss,
Petitioner entitled to Writ. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, a body corporate, Pltf. and Applt.,
vs. Bismarck Lumber Company, a corporation, et al., Defts. and Respts.
That the tax imposed by the State Sales Tax Act (Chapter 249, Session
Laws 1937) is laid upon the 'buyer and not upon the seller. Jewel Tea Company vs. State Tax Commissioner, 70 N. D. -, 293 N. D. 386.
That the entire power of taxation abides in the states and except as restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the power of the states
to tax is absolute.
That the test as to whether a tax laid on a federal instrumentality is
constitutional and valid, is, does it hinder or embarrass the instrumentality
in the performance of its governmental functions. If it does not, it is valid.
That the tax laid under the State Sales Tax (chapter 249, S. L. 1937) on
sales to a federal land bank of lumber and other building material to be used
in the conservation and repair of buildings and fences on farm lands acquired
by the bank through the foreclosure of mortgages securing farm loans made
pursuant to the Federal Farm Loan Act (Chapter 245, 39 Stats. 330, 12 U. S.
C. A. sections 641 et seg, and acts amendatory thereto) is, for reasons stated
in the opinion a valid and constitutional tax.
From a judgment of the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred
Jansonius, Judge, plaintiff appeals. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by
Nuessle, J. Christianson, J. dissents. Morris and Burke, JJ not participating.
Swenson and Grimson, District Judges sitting in their stead.
In Ernest E. Ostmo, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Alfred Tennyson, Deft. and Applt.
That on an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial, this
court will not consider a second motion for a new trial made after the appeal
and which is not included in the appeal.
That the fact that a witness was one of the bailiffs in charge of the jury
during its deliberatitons is not in itself reversible error in the absence of a
showing of prejudice to the appellant.
That upon an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial,
this court does not review any alleged errors not brought to the attention of
the trial court upon the hearing of the motion.
That where, upon the sustaining of an objection to questions propounded
by one of the litigants this party makes an offer of proof, such offer must
be sufficiently definite that the court may know therefrom what facts are
sought to be introduced in order to determine whether the proffered testimony has any bearing upon the case.
That in an action to recover damages to a truck, the offending party is
not entitled to show, for the purpose of minimizing the damages, that the
truck was repaired at no expense to the owner.
That evidence examined, and it is held; that there was sufficient evidence on all debatable issues to require the trial court to submit all these
issues to the jury, and the verdict of the jury thereon is controlling.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Hon. F. G. Swenson, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
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THE LAYMAN AS HIS OWN LAWYER
The attempt of the layman to be his own lawyer, is
not restricted to the making of Wills. In the recent
case of Hathy-vs.-Mathy, 291 NW 761, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin says:
"The plaintiff asks in an amended complaint for
reformation of the original deed on the ground of mistake. But there is no evidence of any mistake in the
drafting of it. None of the parties to the instrument
testified to any mistake. It was perhaps a mistake
to have had the deed drawn by one not a lawyer, but
that is the kind of a mistake for the correction of
which no remedy has yet been found."
The attorneys argued the lack of legal sequence in
the language of the deed as affecting its legality, and
the court said,-"It would be necessary to bear in
mind in determining the meaning of the deed, that
when the instrument is drawn on a printed form, written or typed portions of it are more strongly indicative of intent than seemingly inconsistent of the printed portion. Such provisions are likely to be inserted,
especially by unskilled scriveners. wherever there is a
blank space -to insert them rather than where in legal
sequence they properly belong."
Well, one might say,-All right, this sort of conveyancing makes work for the lawyers, and plenty of
it where it goes to the Court of last resort as it did in
the above case, but on the other hand it is an imposition upon the parties, and an infringment of the rights
of attorneys and unauthorized practice. But today in
this state it is a common practice for clerks to draw
wills, and do conveyancing. It is difficult to fix the
violation on the party; we are receiving much better
cooperation from the banks as a whole than ever before but as to others it is just the same.
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ANNUAL MEETING-SUGGESTIONS
The next annual meeting of the State Bar Association will be
held at Bismarck, N. D., on September 18th and 19th, 1941,
under the auspices of the Burleigh County Bar Association.
The plan inaugurated at the annual meeting last year at
Fargo of a short legal institute will be continued under the joint
guidance of the committee on the Legal Institute of which George
A. Soule of Fargo is chairman, the local committee of the Burleigh
County Bar, and your state officers.
And at this time we need the cooperation of the members in
suggesting topics that they wish to have presented on this program, as well as lawyers who, in their judgment, are qualified to
present practical discussions of their particular fields of law practice. Such suggestions can be sent to your secretary at the office
of the association at Dickinson, N. D.

WHAT UNDER THE
NAVIGABLE WATERS CONSTITUTION IS A NAVIGABLE STREAM
This is an action by the United States to enjoin the
construction of a dam on the New River in Virginia without a
license from the Federal Power Commission, as provided for in
the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. The respondent sets forth
the following defenses: (1) That the New River is non-navigable;
(2) That should the New River be declared navigable the conditions of any federal license must be strictly limited to the protection of the navigable capacity of the waters of the United
States; (3) That the Commission's refusal to grant a minor part
license containing only such conditions was unlawful, and that
any relief should be conditioned upon the Commission's granting
respondent such a license. Held, the New River is navigable and
subject to federal control under the delegated powers in the Commerce Clause. (2) That the term navigation as construed covers more than just the control of the waterway itself. The Court
states that the power is as broad as the needs of commerce, and
that navigable waters are the subject of natural control and
planning is the broad regulation of commerce granted to the federal government. (3) That the license may contain these provisions which the Commission may deem necessary in the exercise of supervision and control over such navigable waters.
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 61 S. Ct.
291 (1940).
The above decision is the farthest the Supreme Court has
ever gone by judicial construction in advancing the development
of the federal control over rivers. The rule followed up to the
time of this case was found in this Court's decision in The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1868), stated as follows: "Those
rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
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are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways of commerce, over which trade and travel
are, or may be, conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the state, when
they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water." This rule from The Daniel Ball case was the basis
of the holding by the District Court and by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, to the effect that the New River was not navigable. The
early common law rule was that all rivers affected by the ebb
and flow of the tides were navigable. Grand Rapids and Indiana
Railroad Company v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 15 S.Ct. 991, 40 L. Ed.
85 (1895). But this rule has not found wide acceptance in the
United States and Canada because of the great fresh water lakes
and inland rivers found so commonly here, as to which the
common law rule was inapplicable. In The Montello, 20 Wall. 450,
22 L. Ed. 391 (1853), the court held that the probability of use of
waterway by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river.
In the Economy Light and Power Company v. United States, 256
U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 409, 65 L. Ed. 847 (1920), the Court said
navigability does not depend on the type of use or the difficulties
attending navigation, such as falls, rapids, and sandbars, even
though these be so great that they prevent the use of the best
means of commerce. It is dependent rather upon whether the
stream in its natural state is such that it affords a channel for
useful commerce.
Among the considerations of prime importance in the determination of the navigability of rivers are: First-Its natural
navigability. This is essential; no legislative enactment can declare a stream to be navigable when it is not so in its natural
state. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S.316, 37 S. Ct. 380, 61 L.
Ed. 746 (1916). Secondly-The depth or capacity for floatage.
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197,
70 L. Ed. 465 (1925).
Thirdly-In general, a stream must be
used for trade or agriculture rather than for mere pleasure, and
must be capable of sustaining more than a mere rowboat to be
termed a navigable stream. North American Drege Company
v. Mintzer, 245 Fed. 297, 157 C. C. A. 489 (1917).
FourthlyIn order for a stream to be classified as navigable it need not be
navigable in its entirety. It can be navigable in part only, and
still be regarded as navigable in the parts that are navigable..
St. Anthony Falls Water Company v. St. Paul Water Commission,
168 U. S. 349, 118 S. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 497 (1897). A stream
that can be made navigable is navigable within the meaning of
the constitution, and the true test of navigability is the capacity
of the stream to be used after improvement for the purposes of
transportation and commerce.. This is a question of fact, the

